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CHANGING THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF VOTING RIGHTS
FROM COLOR-CONSCIOUS TO COLOR-BLIND:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM BY THE REHNQUIST COURT
Carroll Rhodes*
I. INTRODUCTION
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno1 and Miller
v. Johnson' have sparked a national firestorm within the civil rights community
over minority voting rights. Both Shaw3 and Miller4 dramatically altered long-
standing constitutional voting rights jurisprudence. The firestorm created by the
decisions calls into question the moral conviction of the nation to adhere to the
principles embodied in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. This Article will discuss the nucleus of that firestorm - the
Supreme Court's recent activism in changing constitutional voting rights
jurisprudence from color-conscious to color-blind.
The analysis begins with a historical review of how pre-Civil War America
viewed minority voting rights. This will be followed by a discussion of the pur-
pose for creating the constitutional guarantee of minority voting rights. Then,
the Article will address voting rights protected by the Civil War Amendments as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court for more than a century. Finally,
the Article will address the Rehnquist Court's re-interpretation of voting rights
protected by the Civil War Amendments.
* B.A., 1973, Millsaps College; J.D., 1978, University of Mississippi. The author, a member of the Board
of Directors for the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, is an active Civil Rights and Voting Rights
practitioner who currently practices in Hazlehurst, Mississippi.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
3. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
4. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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II. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF How PRE-CIVIL WAR AMERICA
VIEWED MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
The history concerning constitutional guarantees of voting rights for racial
minorities5 can be traced to Colonial days. When Africans6 first arrived in
5. The phrase "racial minority" refers to a racial group that historically has been dominated socially, eco-
nomically, and politically by another racial group. Such a minority group is not a "racial minority" simply
because members possess similar physical characteristics or share a common cultural background. Nor is the
group necessarily a minority in a purely numerical sense. For instance, Mississippi's population was majority
black for a century-from 1840 until 1940. MISSISSIPPI POPULATION 1800-1970 (1974) (on file with the
Mississippi Department of Archives & History). Yet, the state's black population was viewed as a minority
group during this period. VERNON L. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890 (1947); NEIL R.
MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY (1989). "Racial minorities" are minorities because they share a common historical
social, educational, economic, and political heritage and maltreatment because of that heritage by another racial
group exercising power in social, educational, economic, and political affairs. The Supreme Court in Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), stated why African-Americans are viewed as a racial minority group.
There, the Court said:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order; and althogether
[sic] unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and law-
fully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article
of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed
and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well
as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every
grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in
matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
Id. at 407.
The Thirteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified to end the scourge of slavery. Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S.
527 (i044); Poliock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1944). The Fourteenth Amendient was proposed and ratified
to give the newly freed slaves and their descendants the same citizenship rights, privileges, and immunities as
those enjoyed by white citizens, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 72, 73-74 (1872); Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 19 (1906); United States v. Wong Kim, 169 U.S. 649, 675-676 (1898), and grant them equal protec-
tion of the laws, Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-306
(1879) ("It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are
enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment,
whenever it should be denied by the States."). And the Fifteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified to
grant the newly freed slaves and their descendants the right to vote. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389
(1881); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637 (1883); Ex ParteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884).
Although the Fifteenth Amendment was the primary constitutional vehicle used to guarantee voting rights to
racial minorities, the Fourteenth Amendment has been utilized to ensure that their voting strength in apportion-
ment matters is treated as equally under the law as white voting strength. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-
770 (1973).
For a century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees as protecting, inter
alia, the voting rights of minorities. Minorities in this context meant racial minorities only. Recently, however, the
Court held that political parties may raise constitutional challenges to districting schemes under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986). Political minorities until recently were not protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), a divided Supreme Court held that
(congressional) apportionment matters were political questions not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
"political questions" doctrine had been crafted by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 39-
47 (1849), before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, the doctrine was used by the courts to
skirt Equal Protection arguments made by political minorities until 1962 when Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
was decided. In Baker, the Court distinguished between political questions and federalism questions. Id. at 210.
Political questions, the Court reasoned, relate to separation of powers issues involving co-equal branches of gov-
ernment on which the judiciary generally gives deference. Id. However, apportionment relates to federalism
issues involving the relationship of state action to the federal Constitution on which the judiciary does not defer.
Id. at 209-10; THE OxFoRD CoMTANIoN TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 651-52 (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
1992) [hereinafter THE OxFoRD COMPANION]. Prior to BAKER, any Fourteenth Amendment voting rights belonged
to racial minorities. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
661-62, 664 (1944). It was only after Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962), that the Court recognized that
political parties may claim voting rights protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. .
This Article focuses on the constitutional guarantees of voting rights for racial minorities.
6. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the voting rights of African-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and
other racially identifiable minorities historically suffering from dejure and defacto discrimination. White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 757-70 (1973). However, this Article addresses the constitutional protection of voting
rights for African-Americans-the group to which the constitutional guarantees of the Civil War Amendments
were originally extended.
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Colonial America in 1619, they were not given the same rights, privileges, or
immunities as whites.' Native Americans were driven from Colonial America
into tribal conclaves.9 Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans,"° Asian-Americans, 1
and other racial minorities had not become a significant part of Colonial
America. 2 During the Colonial Period, however, the status of free blacks "was
fairly high.""3 Even during the Revolutionary War, the status of free blacks
remained high. 4 "After that time, however, their status deteriorated until toward
the end of the slave period the distinction between slaves and free Negroes had
diminished to a point that in some instances was hardly discernible."'" White
7. Twenty Africans were left at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619 marking the beginning of the most horrific
practice in this nation's history - slavery. JOHN H. FRANKLrN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
NEGRO AMERICANS 71-111 (1969).
8. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD 19-312 (1978). In his book, Judge Higginbotham traces the legal treatment, or more appro-
priately the legal maltreatment, of blacks in Colonial America from 1619 to the Revolutionary War. Id. This
mistreatment includes the "Black Codes" enacted after the Revolutionary War to ensure subordination of blacks
to whites. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 187-90.
9. The Supreme Court in Scott v. Sandford, noted:
The situation of this population [African-American] was altogether unlike that of the Indian race.
The latter, it is true, formed no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with them
in social connections or in government. But although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and
independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws. Many
of these political communities were situated in territories to which the white race claimed the ulti-
mate right of dominion. But that claim was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the Indians to
occupy it as long as they thought proper, and neither the English nor Colonial Governments claimed
or exercised any dominion over the tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor claimed the right to
the possession of the territory ....
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-4 (1856).
Historians have written about this policy of excluding Native Americans from colonial life:
The only extenuation of American policy toward the natives of North America is that it continued an
old-world process of one race or people pushing a weaker one out of an area that it wanted....
Monroe's administration bowed to demands of the West by adopting a removal policy.
THE OxFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 445 (Samuel E. Morison ed., 1965).
10. ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 20 (1964) ("In the United States the minority groups - except
the Indians and the Negroes - are relatively recent immigrants, who were, for a long time, welcomed into the
country."). Historian George Brown Tindall wrote about the arrival of people of Latin descent to the United
States:
On the other hand the law left the gate open to new arrivals from Western Hemisphere countries, so
that an ironic consequence was a great increase in the United States' Hispanic Catholic population.
The legal arrivals from Mexico peaked at 89,000 in 1924. Lower figures after that date merely
reflect policies of the Mexican government to clamp down on the outflow of labor and stronger
American enforcement of old regulations like the 1882 exclusion of those immigrants likely to
become public charges. Uncounted illegal immigrants continued to come, however, in response to
southwestern agriculture's demand for "stoop" labor. People of Latin American descent (chiefly
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans) became the fastest growing ethnic minority in the country.
G. B. TINDALL, 2 AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 987 (1984).
11. Historian George Brown Tindall writes:
By the 1850s the sudden development of California was bringing in Chinese who, like the Irish in
the East, did the heavy work of construction. Infinitesimal in numbers until 1854, the Chinese in
America numbered 35,500 by 1860.
G. B. TINDALL,1 AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 455 (1984).
12. It appears that significant numbers of non-European racial minorities did not begin arriving in the
United States until the 1850s - more than one-half century after the formation of the new government. See
TINDALL, supra notes 10 and 11.
13. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 217.
14. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 217.
15. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 217-18.
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America viewed African-Americans, at least from the Revolutionary Period until
after the Civil War, as inferior beings18 not entitled to the same rights, privileges,
and immunities as white Americans. 7
Even during the Revolutionary War, Peter Salem and other blacks ironically
fought for this nation's freedom 8 while some were held in bondage.19 After the
16. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856). See also supra note 5. The views of African-
Americans held by white America from the Colonial Period until the decision of Scott v. Sandford, did not die
with the Civil War. In fact, those views were noted eighty years after the Civil War by Gunnar Myrdal in his
book AMERICAN DILEMMA. Arnold Rose, in his condensed version of Gunnar Myrdal's book entitled THE
NEGRO IN AMERICA writes:
If white Americans can believe that Negro Americans belong to a lower biological species than
they themselves, this provides a good reason for saying that the white race should be kept pure. The
theory of the inborn inferiority of the Negro people is, accordingly, used as an argument for the anti-
amalgamation doctrine. This doctrine, in its turn, has, as we have seen, a central position in the
American system of color caste. The belief in biological inferiority is thus another basic support of
the system of segregation and discrimination. White Americans have an interest in deprecating the
Negro race in so far as they identify themselves with the prevailing system of color caste.
Those who need to rationalize and defend the caste system specify that the following statements
shall be held true:
(1) The Negro people belongs to a separate race of mankind.
(2) The Negro race has an entirely different ancestry.
(3) The Negro race is inferior in as many capacities as possible.
(4) The Negro race has a place in biology somewhere between the white man and the
anthropoid apes.
(5) The Negro race is so different both in ancestry and in characteristics that all white
peoples in America, in distinction to the Negroes, can be considered as one race.
(6) The individuals in the Negro race are very similar to one another and all of them are
definitely more akin to une another than to any white inan.
The major observation is that the six points stated above not only represent the ordinary white
American's theory on the Negro race, but also that this theory is needed to rationalize the American
caste situation.
ROSE, supra note 10, at 37.
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856). See also supra note 6.
18. Celebrated historian John Hope Franklin writes of Salem's bravery in battle:
In May, 1775, the Committee on Safety - commonly known as the Hancock and Warren
Committee - took up the matter of the use of Negroes in the armed forces, and came to the signifi-
cant conclusion that only freemen should be used, since the use of slaves would be "inconsistent
with the principles that are to be supported." It is doubtful that this policy was adhered to, for evi-
dently slaves, as well as free Negroes, fought in the Battle of Bunker Hill. Furthermore, many
slaves were manumitted in order to serve in the army. Indeed, one of the outstanding heroes of the
battle, Peter Salem, had, shortly before battle, been a slave in Framingham, Massachusetts. One
story not thoroughly substantiated says that Salem won the admiration of his comrades in arms by
shooting the British Major Pitcairn. Mounting the redoubt and shouting, "the day is ours:' Pitcairn
received the full force of Peter Salem's musket as he fired on the British leader who displayed more
valor than judgment. The death of Pitcairn was a part of the moral victory won by the patriots on
June 17, 1775.
Peter Salem was not the only Negro who succeeded in distinguishing himself at Bunker Hill.
Another, Salem Poor, a soldier in a company and regiment made up largely of white men, won the
praise of all his superiors who said that in the battle he "behaved like an experienced officer as well
as an excellent soldier."
FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 131.
19. Historian Franklin writes:
Negro patriots saw clearly the implications for their own future in their fight against England.
They wanted human freedom as well as political independence. Even before Mrs. Adams pointed to
the inconsistency of fighting for independence while adhering to slavery, Negroes spoke out. As
early as 1766 Negroes were seeking their freedom in the courts and legislatures. In January 1773 a
group of "many slaves" asked the General Court of Massachusetts to liberate them "from a State of
Slavery." In 1774 a group of Negroes expressed their astonishment that the colonists could seek
independence from Britain yet give no consideration to the slaves' pleas for freedom. Negroes made
literally scores of such representations and, in so doing, contributed significantly to broadening the
ideology of the struggle to include at least some human freedom as well as political independence.
FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 138.
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War, Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence," and other
whites formally organized the government of the new nation excluding blacks
from consideration in the founding documents.21 Strikingly, blacks were not con-
20. Although Thomas Jefferson is generally considered the author of the Declaration of Independence, a
Committee of Five was assigned the task of drafting the Declaration. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., supra note 8, at 381.
The Committee of Five consisted of Jefferson, Franklin, Sherman, Adams, and Robert E. Livingston.
HtGGINBOTHAM, JR., supra note 8, at 38 1. "The committee gave Jefferson the responsibility to prepare the first
draft." HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., supra note 8, at 381. When Jefferson finally drafted a document that contained lan-
guage denouncing slavery, the language was redacted from the document by the Continental Congress.
FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 129-30. Professor Franklin writes:
The test of the colonists' regard for slavery came in their reaction to the Declaration of
Independence submitted to the Continental Congress by Thomas Jefferson. The formulation of a
general political philosophy to justify the drastic step the colonists were taking was generally
acceptable, even to the proposition that all men, being created equal, were endowed with "certain
unalienable Rights . . . Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Jefferson's specific charges
against the king were harsh and uncompromising. Among them were the following:
He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of
life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating
and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their
transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, in the
warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where
MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every
legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce; and that this assem-
blage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting these very
people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he deprived them,
by murdering the people upon whom he also obtruded them; thus paying off former
crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to
commit against the lives of another.
These charges, described by John Adams as the "vehement philippic against Negro slavery" were
unacceptable to the Southern delegation at the Continental Congress and were stricken from the
document.
The members of the Congress doubtless realized that Jefferson's bold accusations of the king in
regard to slavery were at considerable variance with the truth. The slave trade had been carried on
not only by British merchants but by the colonists as well, and in some colonies no effort had been
made even to regulate it .... Those who favored slavery at all realized that if Jefferson's views pre-
vailed in the Declaration of Independence, there would be no justification for the institution once
the ties to England were completely cut. It would be better, therefore, to reject the strong language
in which the complete responsibility was laid to the door of George III.
FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 129-30.
21. As the Supreme Court held in Scott v. Sandford:
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language
used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not,
were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the gener-
al words used in that memorable instrument.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
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sidered to be citizens of this new nation22 although they comprised 19.3 percent
of the population.
2 3
This dehumanizing stigma of inferiority remained with African-Americans
from the Colonial Period to the Civil War Period and beyond. Essentially, civi-
lized white society viewed blacks as inferior beings not entitled to the same
rights, privileges, and immunities as enjoyed by white Americans throughout this
nation's history.24 Those views are encapsulated in the celebrated Supreme Court
decision of Scott v. Sandford.2" Dred Scott was "a negro of African descent, his
ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and
sold as negro slaves."26 He was a slave himself, according to the defendant. In
1834, his owner, Dr. Emerson, an army physician, took Dred from Missouri, a
slave state,28 "to the military post at Rock Island in the State of Illinois,"29 a free
state.3 Dred remained in Illinois until 1836 when Dr. Emerson took him to the
military post at Fort Snelling located on the west bank of the Mississippi River in
the Upper Louisiana Territory above Missouri which had been acquired by the
United States from France. 1 Slavery was prohibited in this Upper Louisiana
Territory. 2 In 1835, Major Taliaferro, an army officer, took a slave named
Harriet to Fort Snelling33 where Dred Scott was. 4
22. The Supreme Court held in Scott v. Sandford:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and mean the same
thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the
sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives.
They are what we familiarly call the "sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this people, and
a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons
described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of
this sovereignty. We think they [African-Americans] are not, and that they are not included, and
were not intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can, therefore,
claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of
the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and whether emancipated or not, yet
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the
power and the Government might choose to grant them.
Id. at 404-05.
23. According to historian Rose: "Negroes were 19.3 percent of the American population in 1790 but only
9.8 percent in 1940. There is no doubt that the heavy immigration of whites from Europe accounts for the
largest part of this great decline in the proportion of Negroes until recently." ROSE, supra note 10, at 55.
24. FRANKLIN, supra note 7 (the struggle of African- Americans from the beginning of the slave trade until
the modem civil rights movement in 1965 and white America's views and maltreatment of them); RosE, supra
note 10 (a look at the views white America held and maltreatment of African-Americans); McMILLEN, supra
note 5 (the history of maltreatment of blacks in Mississippi by whites).
25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,404 (1856).
26. Id. at 397.
27. Id.
28. Missouri entered the Union as a slave state in 1821. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 172.
29. 60 U.S. at 397.
30. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 174, 267-68 (In 1830, Illinois was a slave-free state.). When Dred Scott was
taken to Illinois by Dr. Emerson, the state did not recognize or honor slavery. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 174,
267-68.
31. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 397 (1856).
32. Historian Franklin writes: "Dred Scott was a Missouri slave whose master had first taken him to live in
free Illinois and subsequently to a fort in the northern part of the Louisiana purchase, where slavery had been
excluded by the Missouri Compromise." FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 267-68.
33. Scott, 60 U.S. at 398.
34. See supra note 32.
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At Fort Snelling, Major Taliaferro sold Harriet to Dr. Emerson in 1836." That
same year, Dr. Emerson allowed Dred and Harriet to marry there.3" The newly-
weds remained at Fort Snelling until 1838."7 They had two daughters, Eliza and
Lizzie.38 Eliza was born on a steamboat on the Mississippi River "north of the
north line of the State of Missouri."39 Lizzie "was born in the State of Missouri,
at the military post called Jefferson Barracks."4 In 1838, Dr. Emerson brought
Dred, Harriett, and Eliza back to Missouri.41 Dr. Emerson then sold the Scotts to
John F. A. Sandford,42 a New York citizen.43
Sandford physically assaulted and imprisoned the Scott family-Dred,
Harriett, Eliza, and Lizzie-in St. Louis, Missouri.44 Scott sued in federal court
on diversity jurisdiction grounds4" seeking damages4" for his family and their
"freedom on the ground that residence on free soil47 [from 1836 until 1838] had
liberated" them.' Sandford filed a plea in abatement of jurisdiction arguing that
"Dred Scott [was] not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declara-
tion, because he [was] a negro of African descent, his ancestors were of pure
African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves."49
The jury agreed with Sandford.5" The case was ultimately appealed to the United
States Supreme Court where it was argued twice."1
The central question the Court had to answer was "can a negro, whose ances-
tors were imported into this country and sold as slaves, become a member of the
political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and
immunities, guarantied [sic] by that instrument to the citizen[?]" 2 The Court
answered the question in the negative, holding that African-Americans were
"inferior" to whites,53 "unfit to associate with" them and had "no rights which
the white man was bound to respect."5 4 In short, the Court concluded that
African-Americans were not United States citizens entitled to all the rights, privi-
leges, and immunities of the Constitution as were whites.5






41. Id. Apparently Lizzie was not born yet. Lizzie was born in Missouri after her parents were brought back
to the state from slave-free Fort Snelling. Id. See FRANKUN, supra note 7, at 267-268.
42. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 398 (1856).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 400.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 30 and 32.
48. FRANKLUN, supra note 7, at 268.
49. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396-97 (1856).
50. Id. at 398-99.
51. Id. at 399.
52. Id. at 403.
53. Id. at 407.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 404.
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The Court's decision kindled the national debate about slavery and contributed
to the Civil War. 6 The great War Between the States was fought and won, in
part, to grant African-Americans the same freedoms, liberties, rights, privileges,
and immunities as enjoyed by whites-the full rights of citizenship. 7 The guar-
antee of those rights was written into the contract between the federal govern-
ment and African-Americans as the Thirteenth, 8 Fourteenth, 9 and Fifteenth"
Amendments to the Constitution.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS
Even before the Civil War formally ended, Congress debated whether to submit
to the states constitutional amendments abolishing slavery and granting the
newly freed slaves and their descendants the same rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties as white citizens. The Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery6 was
proposed on December 18, 1863.62 The Civil War formally ended in 1865.63
On May 31, 1864, Representative Morris from New York eloquently petitioned
Congress for a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. He argued that the
Constitution granted "authority directing the people (the federal government) to
alter and abolish any law or constitution whenever the public interests demand
it."64 The public interest demanded a constitutional amendment prohibiting slav-
56. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 267-68.
57. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 271-323.
58. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
59. The Fourteenth Amendment granted the newly freed slaves full rights, privileges, and immunities of citi-
zenship and guaranteed to them due process and equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV It has
been said that the Fourteenth Amendment was "the most important of the additions made to the Constitution in
the period following the Civil War." STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS PART I 181
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) [hereinafter STATUTORY HISTORY].
60. The Fifteenth Amendment granted the newly freed slaves voting rights. U.S. CONST. amend. XV
61. The text of the Thirteenth Article of Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:
Amendment XIII
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1, 2.
62. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 59, at 803.
63. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 294 (the Confederate Army surrendered in 1865 ending the Civil War).
64. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2614 (1864).
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ery because it was socially and politically reprehensible as well as morally
wrong. 6 As Representative Morris stated:
Once more: our fathers permitted slavery from a supposed necessity. This was
their first error. They expected it would become extinct under the workings of
the Constitution. This was a second error. Others followed, and since the for-
mation of our Government millions have been enslaved. An entire race has been
deprived of all social rank, barred our schools, shut out from the gospel, and
then held to be inferior for not rising in spite of their hindrances to an equality
with the Saxon in the enjoyment of each of these privileges. Under our
Government the African is a nondescript; he is not a man, nor yet is he a brute;
he has not the rights nor the protection of either; he has no resting place, no
refuge within this land of liberty and Christianity, and yet he is the only inno-
cent party within its entire boundaries. Tell me where he may rear the home
altar and enjoy unmolested the companionship of wife and children. Up to this
hour, such is the force of prejudice, that if, rising above and forgetting the inhu-
man treatment of our Government, the colored man enters our armies and
imperils his life in its defense, he is denied not only the pay but the protection of
a soldier. And yet we crave Heaven's blessing.66
Slavery was abolished on February 1, 1865, when Senate Resolution Number
16 was ratified and signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Vice-President, and the President.6 ' The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified to
abolish slavery permanently while the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to
grant citizenship to the newly freed slaves and to provide them, inter alia, with
due process and equal protection of the laws. 8 It was proposed on June 16, 1866
65. As the Supreme Court stated in the Slaughter-house Cases:
In that struggle [Civil War] slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished. It perished as a necessity
of the bitterness and force of the conflict. When the armies of freedom found themselves upon the
soil of slavery they could do nothing less than free the poor victims whose enforced servitude was
the foundation of the quarrel. And when hard pressed in the contest these men (for they proved
themselves men in that terrible crisis) offered their services and were accepted by thousands to aid
in suppressing the unlawful rebellion, slavery was at an end wherever the Federal Government suc-
ceeded in that purpose. The Proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact as to
a large portion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared slavery abolished in them all. But
the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing the authority of the Federal
Government were not content to permit this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of
the contest or the Proclamation of the Executive, both of which might have been questioned in after
times, and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the
restored Union as one of its fundamental articles. Hence the 13th article of amendment of that
instrument. Its two short sections seem hardly to admit of construction, so vigorous is their expres-
sion and so appropriate to the purpose we have indicated.
Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68-69 (1872).
66. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2614-15 (1864).
67. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 532 (1865).
68. Portions of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution relevant to the dis-
cussions in this article read as follows:
Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction there-
of, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
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and ratified on July 28, 1868.69 After the Civil War, but before ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, blacks were treated as badly as before the Civil War.7"
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress and ratified by the
states to grant African-Americans the same rights, privileges, and immunities of
citizenship as those enjoyed by whites and to secure for them due process and
equal treatment under the law.71
Having been made free and granted rights of citizenship, the newly freed
slaves needed to exercise that freedom in determining their political destiny.
Thus, the Fifteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified. The purpose of the
Fifteenth Amendment was to make the Negro "a voter in every State of the
Union. 7' After all, "laws were administered by the white man alone. '73 African-
Americans, it was believed, "could never be fully secured in their person and
their property without the right of suffrage. 74
The Civil War Amendments were ratified to make blacks free citizens of the
United States with all of the rights, privileges, and immunities as white citizens
including the most preservative of those rights-the right to vote. 75  These
Amendments were unique in scope-unlike any constitutional amendments
before or since. Each of these amendments contained an enforcement clause.
76
None of the Bill of Rights77 contained an enforcement clause.78  Moreover, the
Bill of Rights granted substantive and procedural rights79 to citizens protecting
69. STATUTORY HiSTORY, supr-a note 59, at 1 4.
70. Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872). There the Court stated:
The process of restoring to their proper relations with the Federal Government and with the other
States those which had sided with the rebellion, undertaken under the Proclamation of President
Johnson in 1865, and before the assembling of Congress, developed the fact that, notwithstanding
the formal recognition by those States of the abolition of slavery, the condition of the slave race
would, without further protection of the Federal Government, be almost as bad as it was before.
Among the first Acts of legislation adopted by several of the States in the legislative bodies which
claimed to be in their normal relations with the Federal Government, were laws which imposed upon
the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, lib-
erty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value, while they had lost the
protection which they had received from their former owners from motives both of interest and
humanity.
They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in any other character than menial ser-
vants. They were required to reside on and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own it.
They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and were not permitted to give testimony in the
courts in any case where a white man was a party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy of
bad men, either because the laws for their protection were insufficient or were not enforced.
Id.
71. Id. at 70-71.
72. Id. at 71.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
76. See supra notes 61, 69, and 73.
77. "The Bill of Rights is commonly viewed as consisting of the first ten articles of Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States of America." THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 70.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. Although none of the Bill of Rights contain an enforcement clause, neither
does the Eleventh or Twelfth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
79. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5.
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them against the federal government."0 Those rights were granted only to white
citizens.8" The Fourteenth Amendment granted African-Americans those same
rights 2 and, unlike the Bill of Rights, forbade the States from interfering with
those rights.8 3 In part, because the "southern states and localities enacted Black
Codes to regulate the status and conduct of the newly freed slaves,"8" the
Fourteenth Amendment contained an enforcement clause when it was proposed
in 1866.85 The Fifteenth Amendment, which was proposed and ratified to make
the African-American "a voter in every State of the Union,''8 6 contains an
enforcement clause as well.8 Congress wasted no time in enacting enforcement
legislation after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.88 Congress
immediately passed the Enforcement Act of 187089 "to suppress the K.K.K. [Ku
Klux Klan] and protect Negroes in their rights under the three Amendments." 0
The Civil War Amendments and the Enforcement Act of 1870 guided the
Supreme Court in its initial interpretations of minority voting rights.91
IV VOTING RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS
A. The Reconstruction Era
The Supreme Court's view of voting rights protected by the Civil War
Amendments has primarily mirrored the national political view on race. During
the Reconstruction Era (1865-1876), a Republican-led national government
pushed the Civil War Amendments and enacted federal laws protecting minority
voting rights.92 The national political view was that the newly freed slaves were
citizens of their respective states, entitled to the same rights as whites, including
80. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states),
modified by Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("freedom of speech and of the press... are among
the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States"). The Gitlow decision marked the development of the Supreme
Court's incorporation doctrine whereby the rights guaranteed citizens in the Bill of Rights, which the federal
government could not intrude on, were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting the states from
intruding on those rights as well. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
81. See supra note 21.
82. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-80 (1872).
83. Id. at 80.
84. THE OxFoRo COMPANION, supra note 5, at 309.
85. THE OXFORD COMPANIOn, supra note 5, at 309-10.
86. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
87. See supra note 73.
88. JAMES S. ALLEN, RECONSTRUCTION: THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY 1865-1876 187 (1937).
89. Enforcement Act of 1870, Ch. 177, 16 Stat. 114 (1870) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Supp. 1993)).
90. ALLEN, supra note 88.
91. "Minority voting rights" in the context of this article means "racial minority voting rights." See supra
note 5.
92. See Morton Stavis, A Century of Struggle for Black Enfranchisement in Mississippi: From the Civil War
to the Congressional Challenge of 1965--and Beyond, 57 Miss. L.J. 591, 595 (1987) ("Following a substantial
gain of strength by Republicans in the election of 1866, Congress took over the direction of Reconstruction and
shifted its focus so that black male suffrage became the cornerstone of the program."); see also ROBERT S.
HENRY, THE STORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 500-570 (1938); Allen, supra note 88, at 1-180; JOHN R. LYNCH, THE
FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1913).
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the right to vote. 3 The Supreme Court, in the first case interpreting the Civil
War Amendments in 1873, held the same view.94 The Court, in the Slaughter-
House Cases,9" explicitly noted that the Civil War Amendments were color-con-
scious, designed to give African-Americans the same rights as whites, including
the right to vote.9
The Reconstruction Era was a turbulent time politically as well as socially for
the nation. 7 The Era began to crumble with the rise of white terrorism orches-
trated primarily by the Ku Klux Klan98 to intimidate blacks into not exercising
their political rights.99 The Era ended with the Hayes-Tilden compromise of
1877.00 The compromise effectively ended federal protection for minority vot-
ing rights.0 1 Supreme Court decisions during this period reflected the national
political view of minority voting rights. The Court narrowly defined those pro-
tected constitutional rights0 2 to mean the right of African-Americans to be free
from discrimination in voting.10 3 In this regard, the Constitution was color-con-
scious.
93. See supra note 92.
94. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. W. E. B. Duois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION (1992) (a history of how African-Americans fared during the
Reconstruction Era); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH 1880-1910 (1974) (detailing how Reconstruction Era politics
affected political behavior in the South).
98. "The Ku Klux Klan was started by a group of former officers of the Confederate army in the small town
of Pulaski, Tenn., in 1865." ALLEN, supra note 88, at 185 n.*. See also A. W TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR (1971)
(detailing the birth, rise, purpose, and work of the Ku Klux Klan during the Reconstruction Era).
99. See supra note 98. See also Dunois, supra note 97; HENRY, supra note 92, at 386, 544-70. Historian
John Hope Franklin writes this about the end of the Reconstruction Era:
Reconstruction did not end abruptly as the result of Congressional or Presidential action. Rather it
came to a gradual end as restraints were relaxed and stringent legislation repealed. Just as
Reconstruction began long before the war was over, so it drew to a close long before the final with-
drawal of troops from Southern soil.
FRANKIN, supra note 7, at 328-29.
100. Stavis, supra note 92, at 601. Attorney Stavis writes in note thirty-three of his article:
The presidential election of 1876 was fraught with violence and fraud and in a few critical southern
states, with conflicting certifications as to who had won the election. The inconclusiveness of the
election resulted in the congressional appointment of a bipartisan electoral commission to settle the
matter. D. BROWN, THE YEAR OF THE CENTURY: 1876 333 (1966). Extensive negotiations produced a
deal by which the Republican Rutherford B. Hayes was elected President upon his commitment
effectively to put an end to federal protection of the rights of blacks in the South. Id. at 323-28.
Stavis, supra note 92, at 601 n.33. See also FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 328-29 (the Reconstruction Era did not
end abruptly but ended over an extended period of time).
101. See supra note 100.
102. The Court held in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), that women were not guaranteed voting
rights by the Fourteenth Amendment. This holding was, of course, nullified by ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
103. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875) ("The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of
suffrage upon anyone. It prevents the States, or the United States, however, from giving preference, in this par-
ticular, to one citizen of the United States over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude."); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (implying the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause relates to rights of national citizenship which does not include the right to be free of vio-
lence).
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B. The Benign Years
The national political view on race became somewhat benign toward the end of
Reconstruction. In 1872, Congress passed the Amnesty Act granting amnesty to
"former Confederate leaders."1 4 Those leaders aligned themselves with the
Democratic Party and began an effort to regain control of the governments of the
southern states1" 5 through violence and intimidation of African-American vot-
ers."0 6 By 1890, white Democrats had regained political power in the South and
continued their relentless campaign of disenfranchising black voters.10 7 Supreme
Court decisions during this period reflect this emerging national view that whites
could regain control of southern governments by any means.
The Court, in two cases decided in 1875, sent signals that intimidation against
black voters was permissible. In one case, United States v. Reese,108 the Court
held that the Enforcement Act of 1870109 was unconstitutional because it includ-
ed more offenses than were punishable under the Fifteenth Amendment. 1 0 In the
other case, United States v. Cruikshank,1" the Court held that the indictments
alleging voter intimidation and murder by whites were not specific enough to
charge that the defendants acted in a racially discriminatory manner against
African-Americans in the exercise of their right to vote in a federal election." 2
In these two cases, the Supreme Court was interpreting the power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. And in both cases, the Court decided that
Congress had gone too far. However, in rendering the decisions, the Court noted
that the Fifteenth Amendment was color-conscious, designed to restrain the
states or the United States "from giving preference" in voting matters "to one cit-
izen of the United States over another on account of race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude."
'"13
104. ALLEN, supra note 88, at 189.
105. ALLEN, supra note 88, at 187-93.
106. ALLEN, supra note 88, at 197-204 (detailing the reign of terror of the K. K. K. and other white suprema-
cist groups in murdering, threatening, and intimidating black and white Republican voters in the southern states
to keep them from voting in the elections of 1872, 1874, and 1876).
107. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 326-43 (detailing how white Southern Democrats regained control of politi-
cal power and implemented a strategy of disenfranchising almost all African-Americans).
108. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
109. See supra note 92.
110. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875).
111. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
112. Id. at 557-59.
113. Reese, 92 U.S. at 217.
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After these decisions, the reign of terror escalated,114 and protection of African-
American voting rights declined in importance as a national goal. Congress, in
1894, repealed part of the Enforcement Act of 1870.115 The southern states, led
by Mississippi, disenfranchised, en masse, African-Americans by ingenious con-
stitutional measures' 16 such as the poll tax, head tax, and the literacy test. 117 The
Court, during the 1890s and early 1900s, turned its back and hid its face from the
pleas of blacks for constitutional protection.
In Williams v. Mississippi,118 the Court considered whether the systematic
exclusion of blacks from jury rolls in Mississippi by disenfranchising them
through such ingenious devices as poll taxes, head taxes, and literacy tests violat-
ed the Fourteenth Amendment." 9 The Court held that the disenfranchising
devices "[did] not on their face discriminate between the races, and it [had] not
been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible
under them."12 This holding "is viewed by historians as effectively representing
the Supreme Court's approval of the Mississippi disenfranchisement plan."121
This plan, embodied in Mississippi's Constitution (1890), used racially neutral
language122 to disenfranchise blacks although it was drafted for a racially dis-
criminatory purpose."'
114. Historian James S. Allen writes that the reign of terror in Mississippi's statewide elections in 1875
became known as the "Mississippi Plan." ALLEN, supra note 88, at 200-01. As Mr. Allen stated:
What followed came to be known as the "Mississippi Plan for the restoration of home rule." It was
nothing but out-ight terror and massacre of the now defenseless Negroes. On election day they were
kept from the polls. In Yazoo, for example, the Republican vote in 1873 was 2,427 and in 1875 it
was seven. The Democrats gained a large majority in the legislature, elected nearly all county offi-
cials and chose four out of six congressmen. President Grant characterized the new regime as fol-
lows: "Mississippi is governed today by officials chosen through fraud and violence such as would
scarcely be accredited to savages, much less to civilized and Christian people."
Typical of the ferocity of the counter-revolution was the fate of five Reconstruction leaders of the
state who were active since the first "Black-and-Tan Convention." One was assassinated on the
streets of Clinton; another was hanged by the Klan; one was shot in broad daylight and still another
was shot in the courthouse at Yazoo City, while a fifth was found dead in a waterhole. The Boutwell
Committee, appointed by Congress, investigated the Mississippi elections. It had to admit that the
Democratic victory was due to terror and outrages against the Negroes, that the legislature thus
elected was not a legal body and that the state was "under the control of political organizations com-
posed largely of armed men whose common purpose is to deprive the Negroes of the free exercise of
the right of suffrage and to establish and maintain the supremacy of the white-line Democracy."
ALLEN, supra note 88, at 200-01.
Historian Neil R. McMillen characterizes these efforts to disenfranchise black voters as the "First
Mississippi Plan." MCMILLEN, supra note 5, at 39. The First Mississippi Plan was followed by a "Second
Mississippi Plan." McMillen, supra note 5, at 39-48. The purpose of the Second Mississippi Plan was to draft
a state constitution disenfranchising blacks without stating that purpose in the document itself. MCM[LLEN,
supra note 5, at 39-48.
Other southern states copied the Mississippi Plan, devising schemes to disenfranchise black voters beginning
in 1895. FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 339-43; Stavis, supra note 92, at 606.
115. Ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894).
116. See supra note 114.
117. Historian Tindall notes that "since the Fifteenth Amendment made it impossible to disfranchise Negroes
as such, the purpose was accomplished indirectly with devices such as poll taxes, head taxes, and literacy tests."
TINDAL, supra note 10, at 719.
118. 170U.S.213(1898).
119. Id. at 219.
120. Id. at 225.
121. Stavis, supra note 92, at 608.
122. MCMILLEN, supra note 5, at 41-42 (The suffrage provisions of the Mississippi Constitution (1890) did
not mention race).
123. MCMILLEN, supra note 5, at 39-42 (stating the purpose of the Constitutional Convention of 1890 was to
disenfranchise blacks).
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The Court looked only at the face of the constitutional or statutory provision
being challenged to determine whether it passed muster. If the challenged law
contained racially neutral language, it was upheld as constitutional.124 If, howev-
er, the face of the challenged law referenced differential treatment because of
race, it was struck down as being unconstitutional.12 This "eyeball test of dis-
crimination" '26 was limited only to voting.
In the area of public accommodations, the Supreme Court held that a state
could constitutionally enact a statute treating the races differently so long as they
were treated equally.'27 This "separate but equal doctrine" announced by the
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson28 was not a unanimous pronouncement
from the Court.'29 Justice Harlan, in an eloquent dissent, stated that "[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind."'30 The color-blind argument did not carry the day in
Plessy,'3' and "separate but equal" remained the law of the land in the area of
public accommodations and education until 1954 when the Court decided Brown
v. Board of Education.'32
Although the "separate but equal" doctrine did not directly apply to voting
matters, it served notice on America of the Court's view of racial discrimination
in any aspect of American life including voting. In Plessy, a majority of the
Court held that if enforced separation of the races "stamp[ed] .. . a badge of
124. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898).
125. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (declaring unconstitutional a statute excluding blacks
from jury service).
126. The phrase "eyeball test of discrimination" refers to judges looking no further than the cold words of a
challenged statute or constitutional provision or the lines on a map to determine whether or not a challenged
law or plan is racially discriminatory.
127. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that separate but equal treatment of blacks on railroads
was constitutionally permissible); overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that
the "separate but equal doctrine" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The
"separate but equal doctrine" was nothing more than a sham to disguise the efforts of white supremacists to
again subjugate African-Americans to the will of whites. As Professor Franklin writes, "[aln inescapable con-
clusion running through all the studies is that the treatment of the Negro is America's greatest scandal, and the
almost universal rejection of the Negro is America's outstanding denial of its own profession of faith in the
equality of mankind." FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 569.
128. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
129. The decision was seven to one with Justice John Marshall Harlan dissenting, THE OXFORD COMPANION,
supra note 5, at 637, and Justice David Josiah Brewer not participating. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 564.
130. 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The complete context within which Justice Harlan stated his
view that the Constitution is color-blind is the following:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its
great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here.
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil
rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards
man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor
of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision
made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case.
Id.
131. Id. at 537.
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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inferiority"1 3 on African-Americans, it was so "solely because the colored race
[chose] to put that construction upon it."' 34 The Court in Williams acknowledged
that African-Americans could be excluded from voting rolls because of alleged
characteristics of presumed inferiority. 3 ' These cases indicate that the Court
accepted societal discrimination against blacks as axiomatic and constitutionally
permissible if legislation was directed toward characteristics rather than race
itself. By aiming legislation at characteristics rather than race, states could keep
most but not all blacks off the voting rolls. Therefore, whites could control state
government. If legislation was directed at blacks, as a race, then all blacks, no
matter how able, would have been kept off voting rolls. This, the Court would
not permit.
During this period, the Court was not willing to go beyond this limited excep-
tion to what was believed to be permissible discrimination. After all, the Court
was unwilling to become entangled in the electoral process. The Court felt ill-
equipped to supervise local elections. In Giles v. Harris,'38 the Court held that
even if racial discrimination in suffrage matters could be proven, there was no
equitable judicial remedy available.'37 The Court rejected challenges to discrimi-
natory actions by state officials affecting the right of blacks to register and vote
where the state constitutional or statutory provision being challenged was racial-
ly neutral in language.
In essence, the Court applied the eyeball test of discrimination. If the state
constitutional or statutory provision being challenged did not contain language
referencing differential treatment because of race, it was constitutional. If the
challenged language referenced differential treatment because of race, it was
unconstitutional. A case which best illustrates this eyeball analysis is Guinn v.
United States. 8 There, the Court held that a state constitutional provision giving
differential treatment in suffrage to persons entitled to vote on January 1, 1866
- before enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment - contravened that
Amendment 3 '
133. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
134. Id.
135. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1898).
136. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
137. Id. at 487-88.
138. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
139. Id. at 367.
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In all of these cases, however, the Court recognized that the constitutional
guarantees of voting rights14 were color-conscious,141 designed to protect the
voting rights of African-Americans. 42
The problem plaguing the Court was how to recognize efforts by recalcitrant
public officials to discriminate against African-Americans in their quest to gain
and exercise voting rights. Justice Frankfurter wrote in Lane v. Wilson14 that the
Fifteenth Amendment "nullifie[d] sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes
of discrimination." '44 Yet, the Court was unwilling to employ a more analytical
approach than the eyeball test to evaluate voting discrimination claims. Because
of the Court's reluctance to be more analytical, the onerous literacy test 4 ' was
upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections.4' That decision
was short-lived. It was overruled six years later in Louisiana v. United States." 7
In 1927 in Nixon v. Herndon," the Court held that when a state statute on its
face discriminated against black voters by barring them from participating in
white-only primary elections, it was unconstitutional. 49 The Court later restricted
this holding to elections where state officials controlled the party primary
process."5 In Grovey v. Townsend,"'1 the Supreme Court decided that the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom from voting discrimination did not apply to discrimi-
natory acts of private individuals who were not state officials." 2 However, nine
years later in Smith v. Allwright53 the Court overruled Grovey, holding that the
right to vote in a primary5 4 or general election free from racial discrimination was
constitutionally protected when the election process was state controlled."5 The
Court was struggling to adopt a reasoned analysis for voting discrimination.
140. The Court had held that "[tihe Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one."
United States v, Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875). Nevertheless, the Court recognized that "the result might arise
that as a consequence of the striking down of a discriminating clause a right of suffrage would be enjoyed by
reason of the generic character of the provision which would remain after the discrimination was stricken out."
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915). These cases clearly indicate the Court's view that although
the Fifteenth Amendment did not confer the right to vote on anyone, by striking down a discriminatory provi-
sion, the Court could in effect make voters of citizens who had been disqualified as voters under the unconstitu-
tional provision. Consequently, the common mischaracterization that the Fifteenth Amendment granted the
right to vote has continued until today.
141. In all these cases, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903),
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), the Court recognized that the constitutional guarantees of freedom from racial dis-
crimination in voting protect African-Americans from discrimination by governmental officials.
142. The Supreme Court in 1939 held that the Fifteenth Amendment "hits onerous procedural requirements
which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may
remain unrestricted as to race." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
143. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
144. Id. at 275.
145. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), overruled by Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), the Court did not find the literacy test racially discriminatory.
146. 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
147. 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965).
148. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
149. Id. at 541.
150. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
151. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
152. Id. at 53.
153. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
154. In Grovey v. Townsend, the Supreme Court held that exclusions of blacks from all-white Democratic
Party Primary elections did not contravene the Constitution. 295 U.S. at 55.
155. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-65 (1944).
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The common thread running through the quilted patchwork of Supreme Court
decisions in the area of minority voting rights between Reconstruction and the
Warren Court era was that the constitutional protections were color-conscious.
The difficulty the Court had was in recognizing voting discrimination in any
form other than a written legislative admission."' The Court employed a simple
analysis to determine whether a challenged law was constitutional. If the law on
its face referenced different treatment because of race, it was unconstitutional.
If, however, the law on its face did not reference different treatment on account
of race, it was constitutional. The Court did not critically analyze the purpose of
the law nor its application. To determine whether or not a law was discriminato-
ry, the Court looked no further than the face of the law itself. Even so, the Court
still recognized that the constitutional protections of voting rights were color-
conscious.
C. Era of the Warren Court
After Chief Justice Vinson's death, Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court by President Eisenhower in 1953.157 This appointment ush-
ered in a change of analytical approaches in racial discrimination claims. The
new approaches began with the May 17, 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education."5 8 For more than a decade, civil rights legal forces had been mar-
shalled to formulate a plan of attack to strike down segregated education in this
count-, 159 rh_ plan cam to-ether in Brown 16 where the Court looked at the
purposes and effects of segregation laws in the field of education and struck
them down as being inconsistent with the commands of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'61 The decision polarized the nation.'62 But it also signaled that the
156. The Court's holdings that certain laws unconstitutionally discriminated against black voters were based
on self-evident statutes and constitutional provisions. In those laws, state officials tacitly admitted that blacks,
as a race, were being excluded from either the process or the substantive right to vote.
157. ROBERT J. DONOVAN, EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY 161 (1956).
158. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
159. GENNA R. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
136-55 (1983).
160. As noted in THE OXFORD COMPANION, "'Brown was the beginning,' Alexander M. Bickel later wrote -
the beginning not only of substantive changes in the American social structure but also in the nature and expec-
tations of how the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution." THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 93.
161. The Court held in Brown I:
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on. their educational opportunities was
well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule
against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect
upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for
the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational
and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits
they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)(alterations in original).
162. Stavis, supra note 92, at 615 ("Brown was greeted by determined resistance from a wide range of white
leadership throughout the South. One hundred and one southern senators and members of Congress signed the
'Southern Manifesto' which attacked the Brown decision as the substitution of 'naked power' for 'established
law.'").
[VOL. 16:2
1996] JUDICIAL ACTIVISM BY THE REHNQUIST COURT
Supreme Court would more critically analyze laws and actions of state officials
in addressing racial discrimination claims. The Court was ready to move beyond
the eyeball test in analyzing racial discrimination claims.163 It was a precursor of
the landmark constitutional voting rights decisions of the 1960s and 1970s.
Although Brown"6 4 indicated the Court's willingness to move beyond eyeball
analysis in racial discrimination claims, the Court was reluctant to do so in
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections.16 s The Court did not make a
dramatic move until the 1960s. In a string of revolutionary decisions pertaining
primarily to apportionment and boundary matters166 as well as to the right to reg-
ister to vote - Gommillion v. Lightfoot, 7 Baker v. Carr,1" Gray v. Sanders,69
163. The Court probably employed the eyeball test for analyzing racial discrimination claims because of the
history surrounding ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in THE
SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT IS:
At the close of the Civil War, Congress propounded and the states ratified the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." The principal reason for the inclusion of this language in the amendment was to
deal with the so-called Black Codes enacted by the states of the former Confederacy, which explicit-
ly and in no uncertain terms prevented blacks from voting, serving on juries, being witnesses in
court, possessing firearms, and acquiring liquor.
W. H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, HOW IT Is 315 (1987) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT].
Chief Justice Rehnquist writes further that "the problem at which the amendment was directed - the Black
Codes - is bound to shed some light on what Congress meant and the states understood by the words 'equal
protection of the laws."' Id. at 316. Black Codes were
a body of laws ... which covered every aspect of the life of the slave. There were variations from
state to state, but the general point of view was the same in most of such legislation. The point of
view was that slaves were not persons but property; and laws should protect the ownership of such
property, should protect the whites against any dangers that were likely to arise from the presence of
large numbers of Negroes, and should maintain a position of due subordination on the part of the
slaves in order that the optimum of discipline and work could be achieved.
FRANKLIN, supra note 7, at 187-88. The Black Codes were laws that, on their face, treated blacks, as a class,
differently. Under these Codes, discrimination was easy to see. One only had to look at the face of the laws
themselves to determine whether or not blacks were being treated differently and unequally to whites.
164. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
165. 360 U.S. 45 (1959), overruled by Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
166. The Warren Court formulated its constitutional analysis for discriminatory voting rights beginning with
the discriminatory municipal boundary case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In that case, the
Court discussed the concept of vote dilution. Id. at 346. Vote dilution has its origins in Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268 (1939), and is the guiding concept in the one-person one-vote principle first alluded to in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and fine tuned in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The concept of vote dilu-
tion was inimical to the development of the one-person one-vote population equality principle. The principle is
more stringently applied when analyzing congressional apportionment schemes than when analyzing state leg-
islative districting schemes. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). In Gaffney, the Court said
"[T]here are fundamental differences between congressional districting under Art. I and the Wesberry line of
cases on the one hand, and, on the other, state legislative reapportionments governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment and Reynolds v. Sims ... and its progeny." Id. at 741-42.
The Wesberry v. Sanders line of cases requires the achievement of absolute population equality in congres-
sional apportionment. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, reh.
denied 395 U.S. 917 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969). The Reynolds line of cases allows de
minimis deviations, usually no greater than ten percent from absolute population equality, in state and local leg-
islative apportionment. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50
(1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Swann v. Adams,
385 U.S. 440 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-81 (1964). The requirement for population equality
is, thus, more exacting in congressional apportionment than it is in state and local legislative apportionment.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 741-47 (1973).
167. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
168. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
169. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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Reynolds v. Sims,"' Wesberry v. Sanders,171 Louisiana v. United States, 72 and
Mississippi v. United States173 - the Supreme Court analyzed voting discrimina-
tion cases employing vote dilution analysis174 as well as vote denial analysis.
175
In Gomillion,"7' the Supreme Court analyzed the effect of state action in alter-
ing a municipality's boundaries so as to exclude all but four or five of the city's
four hundred black citizens."' Upon analysis, the Court held that whenever "a
legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for spe-
cial discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment."'78 The
statute on its face realigned municipal boundaries by employing racially neutral
language.'79 However, the Court looked beyond the language to the "unequal
weight in voting distribution" 8 ' in reaching its decision. This decision indicated
the Court's willingness to employ vote dilution analysis in voting discrimination
claims.
The Gomillion decision was followed the next term by Baker v. Carr. 81 There,
the Court held that voters had standing to bring a vote dilution claim based upon
the debasement of their voting power. 82 Baker was significant because it evi-
denced the Court's willingness to become involved in state election matters, but
only where the United States Constitution was implicated. The decision inaugu-
rated the most important achievement of the Warren Court-the apportionment
revolution.
183
Baker 84 was followed by Gray v. Sanders8' where the Court held that "[i]f a
State in a statewide election weighted ... the white vote more heavily than the
Negro vote, none could successfully contend that that discrimination was allow-
able."'18  Then the Court in 1964, in Reynolds v. Sims, 8 7 applied vote dilution
analysis and announced the one person/one vote principle,' holding that "the
Equal Protection Clause require[d] that a State make an honest and good faith
effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal
population as is practicable.' 89
170. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
171. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
172. 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (overruling Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)).
173. 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
174. See MINORITY VOTE DILUTION (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989) (defining the concept of minority vote
dilution).
175. Most Supreme Court voting rights decisions until the 1960s focused on an outright denial of voting
rights. See supra notes 105, 110-15, 138-61 and accompanying text.
176. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 346.
179. Id. at 347.
180. Id. at 346.
181. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
182. Baker was filed as a class action "on behalf of all voters of the State of Tennessee." Id. at 204-05.
183. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 57.
184. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
185. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
186. Id. at 379. The Court also held that "[tihe Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying or
abridging a Negro's right to vote." Id.
187. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
188. The Court concluded that "[w]hatever the means of accomplishment [of population equality], the over-
riding objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any
citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." Id. at 579.
189. Id. at 577.
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The Reynolds decision is significant because it marks the Warren Court's
expansion of the class of people protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause to include all citizens-not just racial minorities.190 However,
the decision did not state that the Fourteenth Amendment extended any new citi-
zenship rights or protections to whites. Nor did the decision indicate that the
goal of population equality was more important than the goal of not discriminat-
ing against African-Americans in apportionment matters. After all, it was
axiomatic when Reynolds was decided that the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights guaranteed white citizens certain rights. 9 The Fourteenth Amendment
was proposed and ratified only to give blacks the same rights as whites.'92 At the
time of the decision, African-Americans were still struggling to obtain the right
to vote on an equal footing with whites. 193 Reynolds was revolutionary in that it
extended equal protection in apportionment to all citizens. It did not take away
from any rights guaranteed African-Americans by the Civil War Amendments.
More importantly, the decision did not give whites any rights they did not already
have. The decision only allowed the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause to be used by all voters to ensure voting districts contained equal popula-
tion.
190. In Reynolds, the Court held that "[s]ince the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens
is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guaran-
tees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators." Id. at 565-66.
191. See supra notes 5, 6, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 59, 66, and 71. The legislative histories to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and the 1982 amendment of the Act document the continuing discrimination against African-
Americans in suffrage matters. That history details how blacks have been systematically excluded from the
political process through ingenious schemes of discriminatory devices before 1965 and beyond. See H.R. REP.
No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437; S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 177.
192. See infra note 199.
193. FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT (1992) (detailing the struggle of Blacks to obtain full voting
rights after 1965). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
19961
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The Warren Court's194 voting rights decisions in the early 1960s, culminating
with Reynolds, created some tension between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Those decisions expanded the class of people guaranteed voting
rights protection by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause195
while reiterating that both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments guaranteed
blacks the right to participate in the political process free from discrimination. 96
These decisions demonstrate that population equality must be achieved in appor-
tionment but not at the expense of minority voting rights. Reynolds did not indi-
cate that the constitutional guarantees of voting rights had suddenly become
color-blind. At the Court's next term in Fortson v. Dorsey,97 the Court indicated
that it had not retreated from being color-conscious in reviewing the constitution-
al guarantees of voting rights. The Court stated:
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political ele-
ments of the voting population. When this is demonstrated it will be time
enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.
98
194. Courts are often referred to by the name of the Chief Justice during the tenure of such Justices.
Therefore, the Warren Court is comprised of all the Associate Justices plus Chief Justice Warren during his
tenure. The Justices and the years of service during Chief Justice's Ear! Warren's tenure are as follows:
Justice's Name: Years of Service & President Appointing
Earl Warren, Chief Justice ............................ . .. 1954-1969 - Eisenhower
Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice ............................... 1941-1954 - F Roosevelt
Sherman Minton, Associate Justice ................................ 1949-1956 - Truman
Thomas Clark, Associate Justice .................................. 1949-1967 - Truman
Stanley E Reed, Associate Justice ................................. 1938-1957 - E Roosevelt
Harold H. Burton, Associate Justice ................................ 1945-1958 - Truman
William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice .............................. 1939-1975 - E Roosevelt
Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice .................................. 1937-1971 - E Roosevelt
Stanley E Reed, Associate Justice ................................. 1938-1957 - E Roosevelt
Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice ................................ 1939-1962 - F. Roosevelt
John M. Harlan, II, Associate Justice ............................... 1955-1971 - Eisenhower
William Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice ............................. 1957-1990 - Eisenhower
Charles E. Whittaker, Associate Justice ............................. 1957-1962 - Eisenhower
Potter Stewart, Associate Justice .................................. 1958-1981 - Eisenhower
Byron R. White, Associate Justice ................................. 1962-1993 - Kennedy
Arthur J. Goldberg, Associate Justice ............................... 1962-1965 - Kennedy
Abe Fortas, Associate Justice ..................................... 1965-1969 - L. Johnson
Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice .............................. 1967-1991 - L. Johnson
Chief Justice Warren was appointed by President Eisenhower on October 2, 1953, and took his oath of office
on October 5, 1953. This was a recess appointment. He was not confirmed by the Senate until March 1, 1954.
He took the oath of office after being confirmed on March 2, 1954.
The information obtained for the date of resignation or retirement was obtained from public records and
newspaper accounts.
THE OXFORD COMON, supra note 5, at 965-87.
195. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-69 (1964)(All voters are protected by the Equal Protection
Clause.).
196. The Court in Mississippi v. United States, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) and Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S.
145 (1965), held "that the Attorney General has power to bring suit against a State and its officials to protect
the voting rights of Negroes guaranteed by ... the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments." Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. at 151. The Court in Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969), held that "[u]nequal applica-
tion of the same law to different racial groups has an especially invidious connotation" under the Fifteenth
Amendment.
197. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
198. Id. at 439 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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That same term, in striking down Louisiana's literacy test, the Court held "that
the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so
far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future." '199 A significant indication that the Court had not
retreated from the long-held view that constitutional protections of voting rights
are color-conscious came in Burns v. Richardson."' There, the Court opined:
Where the requirements of Reynolds v. Sims are met, apportionment schemes
including multi-member districts will constitute an invidious discrimination
only if it can be shown that "designedly or otherwise, a multi-member con-
stituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case,
would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population. 20 1
In essence, the Warren Court recognized that the goal of population equality in
apportionment matters must yield to the goal of non-discrimination when the two
conflicted. The conflict had to be resolved in a manner that achieved both goals
without subordinating the goal of non-discrimination. The Court recognized that
the tensions created between the expanded classes of people protected by the
Equal Protection Clause and the rights of African-Americans to be free from dis-
crimination must be resolved in a manner that protected African-Americans' vot-
ing rights. The constitutional protections of voting rights were still color-con-
scious.
D. The Burger Court
When Chief Justice Warren resigned in 1969,202 President Nixon appointed
Court of Appeals judge Warren E. Burger Chief Justice.0 "Contrary to expecta-
tions, while Burger was Chief Justice,0 4 the Supreme Court consolidated most of
the major initiatives of the Warren Court (such as civil rights and reapportion-
ment), although the pace of change became more moderate."2 The Burger
199. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
200. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
201. Id. at 88 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
202. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 982.
203. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 104.
204. Chief Justice Burger served in that capacity from June 23, 1969 until he retired on September 26, 1986.
THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 982.
205. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 104-05.
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Court2 6 essentially began slowly to apply the brakes to the freedom train of
minority voting rights. Those rights remained on track, but the goal of reaching
the station was once again slowly becoming out of reach for many racial minori-
ties. Their rights remained protected throughout the Burger Court years, but
those protections were increasingly more difficult to maintain.
Indicative of the Court's continued protections of minority voting rights is the
White v. Regester decision.2"7 There the Court affirmed a lower court decision
striking down a state legislative reapportionment plan which diluted minority
voting strength as unconstitutional under the Civil War Amendments. 0 8 In
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,20 9 the Court upheld the creation of dis-
tricts containing a racial minority population of sixty-five percent in order to
"afford fair representation to the members of those racial groups who [were] suf-
ficiently numerous and whose residential patterns afford[ed] the opportunity of
creating districts in which they [would] be in the majority. '210  These decisions
support the conclusion that the Burger Court recognized that the constitutional
protections of voting rights were color-conscious.
In spite of these decisions, however, an ominous cloud appeared on the horizon
in 1978. That is when a fractured Court21" decided Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.21 2 Although Bakke was not a voting rights case, the decision
created a tidal wave in civil rights law which eventually sent rippling effects into
the voting rights area. In Bakke, a disgruntled white applicant for medical school
at the University of California at Davis campus brought an action claiming that
his medical school application had been rejected and less qualified minority
applicants had been accepted under a special admissions program reserved for
206. The Burger Court consisted of the following Justices:
Justice's Name: Years of Service & President Appointing
Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice ................................... 1969-1986 - Nixon
Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice .............................. 1967-1991 - L. Johnson
Byron R. White, Associate Justice ................................. 1962-1993 - Kennedy
Potter Stewart, Associate Justice .................................. 1958-1981 - Eisenhower
William Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice ............................. 1957-1990 - Eisenhower
John M, Harlan, 11, Associate Justice ............................... 1955-1971 - Eisenhower
William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice .............................. 1939-1975 - E Roosevelt
Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice .................................. 1937-1971 - F. Roosevelt
Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice .............................. 1970-1993 - Nixon
Lewis Powell, Jr., Associate Justice ................................ 1972-1987 - Nixon
William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice ............................ 1972- - Nixon
John P. Stevens, Associate Justice ................................. 1975- - Ford
Sandra D. O'Connor, Associate Justice ............................. 1981- - Reagan
The dates of resignation or retirement from the Court were obtained from public documents and newspaper
accounts. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 965-87.
207. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
208. Id. at 769-70.
209. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
210. Id. at 168. In upholding the creation of election districts containing a minority population of sixty-five
percent, the Court indicated an awareness that the constitutional protections of voting rights are color-con-
scious. The Court held that "[T]he Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights Act from
deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reapportion-
ment plan complies with § 5." Id. at 161.
211. As Justice Brennan wrote in his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, with the majority's
decision, "no single" Justice spoke "for the Court" in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265, 325
(1978).
212. Id. at 271-72.
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minorities in violation of Equal Protection rights secured to him under the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 Essentially, Bakke alleged that the University of
California had engaged in reverse discrimination 214 against him in favor of less
qualified minority applicants simply because he was white.215 A majority of the
Court, in striking down the special admissions program as an unconstitutional
quota, 21 6 debased the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and ignored our
nation's history on race217 and the continuing and contemporary societal discrim-
ination against African-Americans." 8 In diminishing the historical and contem-
porary plight of African-Americans in this country, the Court held that "[t]he
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend[ed] to all persons."21 9 That
holding was predicated upon the reasoning that "equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color."220 The Court ignored the fact that whites have always
controlled power in this country whether it was in government, politics, educa-
tion, or public accommodations. The Equal Protection Clause was extended only
to those groups - minorities in the exercise of power - needing protection
from domination by whites. If whites controlled not just the seats of power but
also the apparatus that made the law, then what protections did they need from
groups powerless to change or control the law? Considering our national and
constitutional history surrounding racial discrimination and the Fourteenth
Amendment, the reasoning of the majority is questionable.
Four Justices - Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun - in an opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted that the principal of equality did
not come into being for African-Americans until ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it has been an unfulfilled promise since then. 2 ' As Justice
Brennan poignantly stated, "[a]gainst this background, claims that law must be
'color-blind' or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy must
be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality."
222
The Court's holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
provided protections to whites as well as blacks was based upon the fallacious
assumption that African-Americans have the same inherent rights as whites
under the Constitution and Bill of Rights. While in the abstract this is true, his-
torical and current evidence shows that blacks were not considered citizens until
1865,223 and they still suffer from the evil of discrimination and the evil's linger-
ing effects.224
213. Id. at 276-78.
214. Id. at 269-80.
215. Id. at 288-90.
216. Id. at 287-320.
217. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
218. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 177.
219. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978).
220. Id. at 289-90.
221. Id. at 326-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 327.
223. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
224. The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 mentions aspects of discrimination
and lingering effects of discrimination blacks still suffer in the exercise of the franchise. See S. REP. No. 417,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 177.
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Despite Bakke, the Burger Court continued to recognize the principle that con-
stitutional protections of voting rights are color-conscious. In another fractured
decision225 - Mobile v. Bolden228 - a plurality of the Court reaffirmed the
Court's previous holdings that "legislative apportionments could violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel
out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities." '227 The plurality noted,
however, that racial minorities must prove that the challenged apportionments
were created or maintained for a racially discriminatory purpose. 28 A racially
discriminatory purpose in the creation or maintenance of an apportionment plan
may be proven by either direct evidence of a racially discriminatory intent229 - a
smoking gun, or by circumstantial evidence including the "historical background
of the decision,"23 the "specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision," '231 "[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence, 232 and the
"legislative or administrative history."
233
The Court, in effect, placed a more stringent barrier for minority voters to
overcome in proving their voting discrimination claims. The Warren Court
expanded analysis of voting rights claims from eyeball analysis to vote dilution
analysis. The Burger Court then articulated a heightened standard of proof
required of racial minorities and a heightened analysis of vote dilution claims by
the courts to determine whether or not voting discrimination had occurred.
Courts could no longer look at the results of a challenged electoral scheme.
They now had to delve into the minds of the framers of the schemes to ascertain
their purpose for creating it.234 Regardless, the Court did not retreat from the
long held principle that protection of minority voting rights is color-conscious.
Indeed, the Burger Court recognized that the constitutional protections of voting
rights were color-conscious. The Court only reasoned that racial minorities had a
difficult burden of proving that state and local governments had denied them
those protections.
225. Justice Stewart delivered an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58-80 (1980). Justice Blackmun, in a separate opinion, concurred in the results.
Id. at 80-83. Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 83-94. And Justices
Brennan, White, and Marshall, in separate opinions, dissented. Id. at 94-141.
226. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
227. Id. at 66.
228. Id. at 66-69.
229. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
230. Id. at 267.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 268.
234. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) ("More recently, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp.,... the Court again relied on Wright v. Rockefeller to illustrate the principle that '[piroof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."').
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V THE REHNQUIST COURT'S RE-INTERPRETATION OF GUARANTEED
VOTING RIGHTS FROM COLOR-CONSCIOUS TO COLOR-BLIND
A. Changing of the Guard and Direction of the Court
Chief Justice Burger retired in 1986, and President Reagan elevated Associate
Justice William H. Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice,235 thus creating a
vacancy in the Associate Justice's position. President Reagan then appointed
Appeals Court Judge Antonin Scalia to fill the Associate Justice vacancy,2 36 giv-
ing him two appointments to replace one retiring Chief Justice.
In all, President Reagan filled four vacancies on the Court by appointing
Rehnquist as Chief Justice and Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and
Anthony M. Kennedy as Associate Justices. 37 More than any other President
since Franklin Roosevelt, Reagan2 38 sought to control the judicial philosophy and
decisions 39 of the Court by appointing activist jurists. 4  His appointees both to
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had to pass a litmus test of conserva-
tive values. 41 Those values included dismantling any special protections guaran-
teed to minority voters in apportionment matters.242
Of course, President Reagan's success at packing the Court with activist judges
is grounded in the Republican Party's efforts, beginning in 1964, to realign its
constituency and philosophy.24 3 Until then, the Party, in theory rather than prac-
tice, supported civil rights for racial minorities. During the 1960 presidential
election, both the national Republican and national Democratic Parties supported
civil rights.244  However, that changed in 1964 when Senator Barry Goldwater
235. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 965-82.
236. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 756, 982.
237. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 756, 982.
238. JAMES M. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 291-316 (1956) (discussing President Franklin
Roosevelt's court packing plan); S. SHULL, A KINDER, GENTLER RACISM? THE REAGAN-BUSH CIVIL RIGHTS
LEGACY 165 (1993) (discussing President Reagan's success in appointing Supreme Court Justices in 1981 and
1986 who were "activists for his agenda and conservative on civil rights").
239. W. EDEL, THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 112-24 (1992) (discussing President Reagan's attempt to change the
philosophy and direction of the Court). Mr. Edel writes that "President Reagan made no secret of his desire to
completely reshape the character and philosophy of the federal courts." Id. at 112. It has been noted that
Reagan had a "profound impact on the judiciary" because "in two full terms, he named about half the federal
judges." SHULL, supra note 238.
240. Political scientist Glendon Schubert has given the following possible definitions of judicial activism:
One possible definition of judicial activism is that it consists of any attempts of justices to change
the policies of the Court. Thus, when a majority of the justices agree upon the direction of change
that they deem desirable in regard to a particular policy, the position of the Court is activist....
An alternative functional theory of judicial activism and restraint defines activism in terms of
disharmony, and restraint in terms of harmony, between the policy of the Court and that of other
decision-makers. We define "other decision-makers" quite broadly, to include (1) Congress, the
President and administrative agencies, and lower national courts, and (2) the analogous officials of
state governments....
GLENDON SHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING 153, 154 (1965).
241. EDEL, supra note 239, at 112-24.
242. EDEL, supra note 239, at 112-24.
243. KEVIN P PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLIC MAJORITY 206-207 (1970) (discussing realignment of con-
servative and Southern voters from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party after 1964).
244. INSIDE POLITICS: THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS, 1960 55-98 (P. Tillett ed., 1962) (detailing the struggle
and success of Richard Nixon, the Republican nominee for President in 1960, and Nelson Rockefeller to
include a liberal civil rights plank in the Republican Party Platform, and detailing the struggle and success of
John Kennedy, the Democratic nominee for President in 1960 to include a liberal civil rights plank in the
Democratic Party Platform).
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became the Republican standard bearer.245  The Party's "Southern Strategy, 246
passage of and enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965247 by the Democratic
Congress, and the Johnson Presidency drove many poor southern white voters to
the Republicans.248 With this new constituency, the Republican Party became
increasingly conservative and non-supportive of civil rights. The Party's meta-
morphosis from supporter to dismantler of civil rights was hastened by the elec-
tion and re-election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 and 1984.249 Many
conservative Republicans rode his coattails to Congress, including the Senate,
the body which confirmed his appointments to the Court and Cabinet and sub-
Cabinet level Justice Department positions.50 President Reagan appointed con-
servative officials to high level Justice Department positions who, in turn, care-
fully screened judicial nominees to ensure that their philosophy on civil rights
was compatible with his.
25 1
While President Reagan's election victories hastened the Republicans' meta-
morphosis, President Bush's election in 1988 completed it. He did not substan-
tially deviate from his predecessor's judicial selection policies.252 Two vacancies
occurred on the Court during his Presidency. Justices Brennan and Marshall
retired in 1990 and 1991 respectively.2 3 President Bush appointed Appeals
Judge David Souter to replace Justice Brennan and Appeals Judge Clarence
Thomas to replace Justice Marshall.25 4 With these appointments, the Court pack-
ing plan started under President Reagan was now complete.
245. Political scientist Kevin Phillips writes:
Not content with forging evolutionary gains in the Outer South, GOP conservatives set up the
"Southern Strategy," which helped achieve the 1964 nomination of Barry Goldwater. Simply put,
the idea was to join the South and West in a conservative coalition. What would have happened had
the GOP been able to nominate a more moderate conservative will never be known. Instead, the
party chose Barry Goldwater, and his platform-quite conservative to begin with - was quickly
propagandized as barely disguised racism in the Deep South vein. This image gained so much cre-
dence that Goldwater swung the Deep South into the Republican column but sacrificed the rest of
the nation, including the Outer South. In essence, Goldwater won where Thurmond had won in
1948, largely for the same reasons. Like Thurmond, Goldwater captured Mississippi, South
Carolina, Alabama and Louisiana, and added Georgia - the next-best Dixiecrat state - to the list.
PHILLIPS, supra note 243, at 204.
246. PHILLIPS, supra note 243, at 204.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Supp. 1993).
248. Kevin Phillips writes:
Displeased by federal intervention on behalf of Negroes, poor whites registered to vote in greatly
increased numbers, offsetting enlarged Negro enrollment in many states. For many years, the poor
whites of the Deep South had shunned the conservatism of States Rights, Dixiecrat and Republican
candidates, but by 1966 they were becoming disillusioned with the stance of the national
Democratic Party.... The Negro socioeconomic revolution gave conservatism a degree of access to
Southern poor white support which it had not enjoyed since the somewhat comparable
Reconstruction era.
PHILLIPS, supra note 243, at 206.
249. SHULL, supra note 238.
250. EDEL, supra note 239, at 112-24.
251. EDEL, supra note 239, at 112-24.
252. SHULL, supra note 238, at 165 (discussing Bush's success at appointing Clarence Thomas to the Court
because "[h]e opposed affirmative action, promoted black self-help, and rejected broad class action suits rather
than specific cases of discrimination").
253. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 965-82.
254. THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 965-82.
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B. The Thornburg Decision
The first major voting rights case reviewed by the Rehnquist Court2 55 was one
of statutory construction which did not involve constitutional issues. In 1986,
the Court, in Thornburg v. Gingles,2 56 held that North Carolina's multimember
state legislative districts resulted in impermissible dilution of black voting
strength in violation of the 1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.257 As necessary preconditions for proving a vote dilution claim, the
Court held that the minority community must demonstrate "that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district,"2 58 that the minority community is "politically cohesive,' 2 59 and that
white bloc voting is legally significant."' The "sufficiently large and geographi-
cally compact" precondition can be traced to Reynolds."1 There, the Court stat-
ed that "a State may legitimately desire to construct districts along political sub-
division lines to deter the possibilities of gerrymandering." '62 The principle of
requiring geographically compact districts in state legislative apportionment
plans is one that has been advocated by civil rights activists263 and applied by the
courts.264 The reason racial compactness is important in apportionment is not
because it is constitutionally required - because it is not265-  but because it is
255. The Rehnquist Court consisted of the following Justices:
Justice's Name: Years of Service & President Appointing
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice ................................ 1986- -Reagan
Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice ............................... 1967-1991 - L. Johnson
Byron R. White, Associate Justice ................................. 1962-1993 - Kennedy
William Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice ............................. 1957-1990 - Eisenhower
Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice .............................. 1970-1993 - Nixon
Lewis Powell, Jr., Associate Justice ................................. 1972-1987 - Nixon
John P. Stevens, Associate Justice .................................. 1975- - Ford
Sandra D. O'Connor, Associate Justice .............................. 1981- - Reagan
Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice .................................. 1986- - Reagan
Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice ............................. 1988- - Reagan
David H. Souter, Associate Justice ................................. 1990- - Bush
Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice ................................ 1991- - Bush
Ruth B. Ginsberg, Associate Justice ................................ 1993- - Clinton
Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice .................................. 1994- - Clinton
The dates of resignation or retirement from the Court were obtained from public documents and newspaper
accounts.
The names of Associate Justices, the dates of service on the Court, and the President appointing them are
taken from public documents and newspaper accounts.
THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 5, at 965-87.
256. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1993).
258. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
259. Id. at 50-51.
260. Id.
261. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
262. Id. at 581.
263. See Frank R. Parker, County Redistricting in Mississippi: Case Studies in Racial Gerrymandering, 44
Miss. L.J. 391 (1973) [hereinafter County Redistricting]; E PARKER & B. PHILLIPS, VOTING IN Mississippi: A
RIGHT STILL DENIED (1981); PARKER, supra note 193, at 85.
264. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (holding that a minority group is required to be "sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district") (quoting Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (holding that Thornburgprecon-
ditions must be adhered to).
265. The Supreme Court noted in Shaw v. Reno that although compactness, continuity, and respect for politi-
cal subdivisions are traditional districting principles, those principles are not constitutionally required. 113 S.
Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
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an "objective factor[ ] that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been
gerrymandered on racial lines."26 Although not constitutionally required, the
Rehnquist Court treats minority geographical compactness as the most important
factor in apportionment when minority districts are created. In other words, the
Rehnquist Court considers the Thornburg minority compactness precondition to
be more important than the constitutional principle of non-dilution of minority
voting strength in apportionment matters. For this reason, Thornburg is an
important case in the revolution of the Rehnquist Court.
C. Shaw v. Reno - The Revolution Begins
While the Court's revolution concerning the constitutional guarantees of voting
rights began with the Warren Court2"7 and continued, to a limited extent, with the
Burger Court,26 it has reached an alarmingly precipitous plateau at a dangerous
rate of speed with the Rehnquist Court. While previous Courts may have applied
the brakes on the freedom train of minority voting rights, the Rehnquist Court
has put the train in reverse throttle at full speed. The Court has finally realized
that it "has considerable latitude to interpret the meaning of constitutional lan-
guage such as . . . 'equal protection of the laws."'269 This latitude has lead the
Court "to feel that the sky is the limit when it comes to imposing their solutions
to national problems on the popularly elected branches of the government and on
the people."27 In doing this, the Court has virtually ignored long established
precedent in the area of constitutional minorit voting rgtS. 271
On June 28, 1993, the Court decided Shaw v. Reno.27 ' The case involved a
challenge by five white voters in Durham County, North Carolina to one of the
state's two majority-black congressional districts created after the 1990
Decennial Census.273 The state's voting age population was seventy-eight percent
white, twenty percent black, one percent Native American, and less than one per-
cent other.274 The black population was "relatively dispersed."27'  Because North
Carolina's total population had increased significantly by 1990, the number of
congressional seats allotted increased to twelve.2 7  The State had not sent an
266. Id.
267. The Warren Court ushered in the concept of minority vote dilution analysis and expanded the class of
persons guaranteed voting rights by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to include all citi-
zens. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
268. The Burger Court ushered in the concept of "reverse discrimination" and heightened analysis for deter-
mining minority vote dilution. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
269. REHNQUIST, supra note 163, at 316.
270. REHNQUIST, supra note 163, at 316.
271. The Court thus far has not uprooted well established voting rights jurisprudence that is statutorily based.
See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (applying Section 2 vote dilution analysis to claims involving single-
member districts); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (same); Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647
(1994) (same). But see Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U. S. 491 (1992) (a case where the Court did
not give Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act the liberal interpretation requested by plaintiffs).
272. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
273. Id. at 2821-22.
274. Id. at 2820.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 2819.
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African-American to Congress since 1901.277 The Legislature "enacted a reap-
portionment plan that included one majority-black congressional district.
2 78
Since part of North Carolina was covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act,279 the Legislature submitted its plan to the United States Attorney General
for preclearance.28 The Attorney General objected to the plan noting that a sec-
ond majority-black district could have been created in the "south-central to
southeastern region of the State."'28' North Carolina went back to the drawing
board and crafted a revised plan creating a second majority-black district "not in
the south-central to southeastern part of the State, but in the north-central region
along Interstate 85."282 This second black district was "unusually shaped"
stretching "approximately 160 miles ... in snake-like fashion through tobacco
country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobble[d] in enough
enclaves of black neighborhoods."'283 This second majority-black district con-
tained a black voting age population (BVAP) of 54.71 percent.284 The
Legislature submitted the revised plan for preclearance, and it was precleared.
2 85
Five disgruntled white voters filed suit alleging that this second black majority
district was an "unconstitutional racial gerrymander" '288 because the district was
"deliberately 'create[d] . . . in which a majority of black voters was concentrated
arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness,
contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions' with the pur-
pose 'to create Congressional Districts along racial lines' and to assure the elec-
tion of two black representatives to Congress." '287 Their chief complaint was
"that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of
race violated their constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral
process."288 In essence, the five white voters made a claim of reverse voting
rights discrimination. A three-judge district court dismissed their claim, and they
appealed.
89
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case holding that "[a] reappor-
tionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same
race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of
277. Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 DisT.
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
278. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (Supp. 1993).
280. Preclearance of voting changes implemented in jurisdictions covered by Section 5 may be obtained
either administratively from the United States Attorney General or judicially from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. See Carroll Rhodes, Enforcing the Voting Rights Act in Mississippi Through
Litigation, Miss. L.J. 705, 708 n.13 (1987).
281. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 2820-21. (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F Supp. 461, 476-77 (Voorhees, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
284. Id. at 2840 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 2820-21.
286. Id. at 2821.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 2824.
289. Id. at 2821-22.
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their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."'2 90 The use
of the phrase "political apartheid" was ill-advised and inapposite to the facts of
the case. Apartheid provides for a complete caste system-a complete separa-
tion of racial groups,291 allowing whites to dominate other racial minorities in
every respect.292 Racial groups in the congressional district challenged by the
five white voters were not separated. On the contrary, the district was integrated
with fifty-five percent of the voting age population being black and forty-five
percent of that same population being white. The black population was "widely
dispersed." Also, white voters were not politically dominated by blacks.
The Court relied upon Gomillion v. Lightfoot93 to support its conclusion that
the challenged districting scheme resembled political apartheid. That reliance,
like the phrase "political apartheid," was misplaced. Gomillion involved the
efforts of a white-controlled government to exclude all but four or five of a
town's four hundred black citizens.294 In other words, Gomillion involved the
efforts of a white-dominated government to exclude between 98.75 percent and
ninety-nine percent of the town's eligible black population. No such efforts
could be discerned in Shaw.29 There was no black-dominated government in
North Carolina seeking to exclude between 98.75 percent and ninety-nine per-
cent of eligible white citizens from District 12. Even more importantly, the
Warren Court analyzed Gomillion using vote dilution analysis by looking at the
"unequal weight in voting distribution. '29" The Rehnquist Court in Shaw did not
look at the weight in voting distribution in the overall apportionment scheme.297
Blacks constituted twenty percent of the state's population, yet only two of the
twelve congressional districts were majority-black.298 The weight of the voting
distribution in Shaw299 was not unequal. The Court's reliance on Gomillion was
misplaced, and its use of the phrase "political apartheid" was vicious, divisive,
and inappropriate.00
The Court's holding that districts are suspect in which racial minorities are in a
majority but are "widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and
who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin"3 1 is
290. Id. at 2827.
291. THE APARTHEID REGIME: POLITICAL POWER AND RACIAL DOMINATION 1-2 (R. Price & C. Rosberg eds.,
1980) [hereinafter THE APARTHEID REGIME].
292. E. DIVORIN, RACIAL SEPARATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF APARTHEID THEORY 56-60 (1952).
293. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
294. Id. at 341.
295. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
296. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960).
297. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2838-40 (White, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2816.
299. Id. at 2820.
300. Four Justices, in dissent, thought the "segregate voters" and "political apartheid" phrases were "ill-
advised," Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2840 n.7 (1993) (White, J., dissenting), and misguided, id. at 2846 n.4
(Souter, J., dissenting). The Court's categorization of the 12th Congressional District as "political apartheid"
has exacerbated racial divisions in this country. As voting rights scholar Frank Parker has written, "The Court's
decision has enormous consequences for minority voters seeking to overcome decades of discrimination in the
electoral process and under representation in Congress, state legislatures, and local governmental bodies."
Parker, supra note 277, at 1, 2.
301. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
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troubling. Seemingly, the overriding concern with the shape of a district elevates
compactness as an objective apportionment criteria to a constitutional goal2
The compactness requirement makes property more important than people in
apportionment. The Shaw decision noted that "[a] reapportionment statute typi-
cally does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses."3 3
The Warren Court assigned a different level of importance to people in appor-
tionment matters. In Reynolds, the Court held that "[l]egislators represent peo-
ple, not trees or acres."3 4 They are not elected by "farms or cities or economic
interests" but by voters.30 ' After Shaw, in order to withstand constitutional chal-
lenges by white voters, legislatures would have to resort to drawing square,
oblong, rectangular, triangular, or oval districts. Although aesthetically pleasing,
such districts are not rooted in reality. Population generally is not evenly dis-
persed either geographically or racially in this country. Reynolds teaches us that.
Existing political boundaries often are not neatly drawn °.3 6 Drawing districts for
the sake of appearance could erode the substantial gains made by minorities over
the past decade 37 and unnecessarily involves the Court in state apportionment
matters. 8
The Shaw decision was revolutionary not only for elevating the importance of
compactness as an apportionment criteria, but also for urging the creation of a
"'color-blind' electoral process."3 9 This was the first time a majority of the
Court tacitly recognized the concept of a color-blind electoral process. In requir-
ing a "color-blind electoral process," the Court held that while apportionment
legislation is "race-neutral on its face," if it "rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis
of race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification," then it violates the
Equal Protection Clause. 10
302. Although the Court recognized that compactness in apportionment plans is not "constitutionally
required," it stated that it is an objective factor "that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerry-
mandered on racial lines." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. In other words, the Court strongly encouraged legislative
bodies to draft compact districts to withstand constitutional attacks by disgruntled white voters. That encour-
agement could have a chilling effect on the efforts of legislative bodies to voluntarily remedy past discriminato-
ry districting schemes that were designed to dilute minority voting strength.
The Rehnquist Court is not the only Court to strongly encourage the creation of compact districts. The
Burger Court, in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425-26 (1977), ordered a three-judge district court in
Mississippi to "either draw legislative districts that are reasonably contiguous and compact, so as to put to rest
suspicions that Negro voting strength is being impermissibly diluted, or explain precisely why in a particular
instance that goal cannot be accomplished." However, the encouragement of creating compact districts in the
two cases are analytically distinct. First, the Connor Court was faced with a districting scheme that split geo-
graphically compact areas of black population between majority-white districts. Id. at 416-19, 424-25. The
Shaw Court was not faced with a districting scheme that split geographically compact areas of white population
between majority-black districts. Second, the black voting strength in Connor was diluted in the challenged
districting scheme. The white voting strength was not diluted in Shaw.
303. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2816, 2826.
304. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
305. Id.
306. See County Redistricting, supra note 263, at 391 (giving examples of bizarrely shaped political units and
subdivisions).
307. See Parker, supra note 277, at 2-6 (discussing gains made by minorities after the 1990 Census).
308. The Court recognized that "reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State."
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)).
309. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993).
310. Id. at2828.
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In determining whether or not an apportionment scheme is an attempt to "sep-
arate voters into different districts on the basis of race," legislative bodies and the
courts must look at minority population concentrations in the plan. The Court
stated:
As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one
community, a- reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in
one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate pur-
poses. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact dis-
tricts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivi-
sions.3 1
1
If the minority population is sufficiently large and geographically insular such
that a compact district could be created where the minority population is in the
majority, then the crafted district will not be suspect. If, however, the minority
population is geographically dispersed such that a compact district cannot be cre-
ated unless the plan's drafters distort the shape of an otherwise compact district,
then the district is constitutionally suspect. 312 The constitutional analysis to be
employed is simple, but not necessarily analytical. The employed analysis is
"analytically distinct" from the analysis employed in vote dilution cases. 313
Under Shaw, legislative bodies and the courts would employ the "eyeball test
of reverse discrimination." ' 4 This test is distinctive from the "eyeball test of dis-
crimination." Under the eyeball test of discrimination, the Court looks upon the
face of the challenged statute to determine whether virtually all blacks have been
treated differently from all whites. Under the eyeball test of reverse discrimina-
tion, the Court looks at the shape of the district. If the district is shaped
bizarrely, then the Court looks at the supporting population data to determine
whether small pockets of minority populations have been grouped together to
form a majority in the minority district.3"' If this is so, then the district is pre-
sumptively constitutionally infirm. 16 To overcome the presumption of invalidity,
the legislative body must offer a rational reason for the district's odd shape and
racial makeup. 7 Compliance with recommendations contained in the Attorney
General's Section 5 objection letter is not a rational reason for the district.318 If
311. Id. at 2826.
312. Id. at 2827. The Court noted that "reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter." Id.
313. Id. at 2830.
314. Under the "eyeball test of reverse discrimination," the courts look at the face of the reapportionment
plan to determine whether or not white citizens are being classified solely on the basis of their race. Id. at
2824-25. Under the Rehnquist Court's analysis, such classifications "threaten to stigmatize [white] individuals
by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility." Id. at 2824. The problem with
the analysis is that white citizens are the dominant group politically as well as numerically in this country. They
have never been stigmatized. As the Court said in Plessy, "We imagine that the white race ... would not acqui-
esce in this assumption." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). It is unlikely that whites would, any
time soon, be stigmatized or dominated by any racial minority. See supra note 5 for a discussion of racial
minorities.
315. Whites comprised forty-five percent of the voting age population in the challenged district. Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2840 n.7 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
316. See id. at 2824. The Court held in Shaw that "[n]o inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the
racial classification appears on the face of the statute." Id.
317. Id. at 2828.
318. Id. at 2830-31.
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"eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination" '19 is the reason for the
bizarre shape of a district, "the State must have a 'strong basis in evidence for
[concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary."' 2" Thus, the Court has created
an additional hurdle for a state to overcome in attempting to eradicate past and
continuing minority vote dilution by creating majority-minority districts with
unusually shaped but contiguous districts.
The Shaw decision is circumspect because it does not address the natural ten-
sion between the expanded protections to white citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the protections guaranteed African-Americans under the
Fifteenth Amendment. 21 The Fifteenth Amendment permits states to create
additional majority-minority districts to remedy past minority vote dilution.322
The Warren Court recognized that when racially neutral apportionment efforts
under the Fourteenth Amendment collide with guarantees of non-discrimination
against African-Americans under the Fifteenth Amendment, the former must
yield. 23
In attempting to create a color-blind electoral system, the Rehnquist Court dis-
regarded the purpose of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 324 and their
color-conscious application for more than a century. More than that, the Court
created a simplistic framework for analyzing the newly created claim of political
apartheid against whites. In creating this simplistic analytical framework, the
Court extended the class of persons protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to
include white persons who needed protection from other white persons (legisla-
tors) with noble intentions of creating majority-minority districts. Shaw was the
shot fired across the bow of the freedom ship signaling that the Court was chang-
ing the course of constitutional guarantees of voting rights from color-conscious
to color-blind.
The decision is revolutionary for another reason. It presumes discrimination
without any direct proof other than the shape of the reapportionment plan.
D. Miller v. Johnson and Beyond - The Revolution Continues
The revolutionary Shaw decision demands close scrutiny of any apportionment
scheme "that is so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other
than race.' ' '321 Shaw authorized disgruntled white voters to bring a reverse voting
discrimination claim provided they live in the district being challenged.326 This
was a new cause of action analytically distinct from vote dilution or vote denial
claims 327 that was untested until 1995 when the Court decided Miller v.
319. Id. at2831.
320. Id. at 2832 (alterations in original)(quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
321. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
322. See United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
323. Id. at 165-68.
324. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
325. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993)(quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
326. United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
327. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824-32 (1993).
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Johnson.28 There, the Court held that Georgia's congressional districts were
drawn in a manner that impermissibly segregated voters
329 on account of race. 3
Before reaching a decision, however, the Court employed the "eyeball test of
reverse discrimination." 331 Upon analysis, the Court, relying upon Shaw, found
that Georgia's congressional apportionment plan was suspect.3 2 The Court noted
that racial segregation of voters was permissible if it was done to eradicate "the
effects of past racial discrimination. 333 However, segregation of voters was con-
stitutionally impermissible if it was done to satisfy a Section 5 objection by the
Attorney General.334 If race was a predominantly motivating factor in the cre-
ation of a district, then it was subject to strict scrutiny.3 35 Compliance with the
Attorney General's Section 5 objection was insufficient justification for the dis-
trict.3
36
Miller is more troubling than Shaw. Until Miller, it was constitutionally per-
missible to consider race in drafting apportionment plans. 37 Miller, however,
has changed that. Now, racial considerations must be subordinated to non-con-
stitutional criteria such as compactness, contiguity, and preservation of political
boundaries in developing districting plans. Suddenly, trees and land have
become more important than people, or more appropriately, just black people.
Districts after Miller must be neatly shaped without regard to the political power
exercised by the inhabitants. The Court noted in Miller that "[o]nly if our politi-
cal system and our society cleanse themselves of that discrimination will all
members of the polity share an equal opportunity to gain public office regardless
of race. 338
While our goal should be a color-neutral society, our history and current social
climate instructs us that we are a long way from it. By acting as if the goal could
be achieved with the stroke of a pen, the Court has perpetuated that discrimina-
tion. It is only when racial minorities can exercise political power in parity with
whites that society will move toward becoming color-neutral. Given our history,
it is seriously doubtful whether we will ever become color-blind.
328. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
329. Impermissible segregation of voters in the context of Shaw and Miller is any district where black voters
constitute a majority of the population that was drawn by banding pockets of black population in a contiguous
district that may not be aesthetically pleasing.
330. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2494.
331. Id. at 2489-90. The Court noted that voters bringing a voter segregation claim unlike voters bringing a
vote dilution claim, do not have to "make a threshold showing of bizarreness." Id. at 2488.
332. Id. at 2482.
333. Id. at 2490 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993)).
334. Id. at 2490-94.
335. Id. at 2490.
336. Id. at 2491.
337. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (holding it is constitu-
tionally permissible to intentionally draw districts that is sixty-five percent black); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973) (holding any apportionment plan should not result in a dilution of minority voting strength).
It is noteworthy that the Rehnquist Court upheld, on statutory grounds, the creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts in Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
338. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2494 (1995).
[VOL. 16:2
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM BY THE REHNQUIST COURT
The Court heard oral arguments in Shaw v. Hunt 39 and Vera v. Richards34 on
December 5, 1995.341 The cases involved reapportionment plans in North
Carolina and Texas, respectively. In both cases, the Court held that the chal-
lenged districts violated the Equal Protection Clause. 42
VI. CONCLUSION
For more than a century now, the Supreme Court has recognized that the con-
stitutional guarantees of Equal Protection and freedom from discrimination in
voting were color-conscious. In less than three years, the Court has revolution-
ized that body of law. The course the Court has chosen will eventually burden
the federal judiciary with thousands of cases with voters clamoring for a share in
political power or total political dominance. The Court has, with the decisions in
Shaw and Miller, not only entered the political thicket, but it has also razed the
land. Unfortunately, the revolutionary decisions will result in more racial dis-
cord than racial harmony. Although the decisions have changed the constitution-
al guarantees of voting rights from color-conscious to color-blind, the decisions
have also heightened racial tension in apportionment matters and in the exercise
of political power.
339. 861 F. Supp. 408 (three-judge court 1994),prob.juris. noted 63 U.S.LW. 3917 (U.S. 1995).
340. 861 F Supp. 1304 (three-judge court 1994), prob. juris. noted Bush v. Vera & Lawson v. Vera, 63
U.S.L.W 3915, 3917 (U.S. June 29, 1995).
341. 64 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. 1995).
342. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1899 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1964 (1996).
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